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International Financial Institutions provide temporary balance-of-payment support contingent on
the implementation of speciﬁc macroeconomic policies. While several emerging markets repeat-
edly used conditional assistance, sovereign defaults occurred. This paper develops a dynamic
stochastic model of a small open economy with endogenous default risk and endogenous par-
ticipation rates in bailout programs. Conditionality enters as a constraint on ﬁscal policy. In a
quantitative application to Argentina the model mimics the empirical duration and frequency of
bailout programs. In equilibrium, conditional bailouts generate high and volatile interest spreads.
A Laffer-curve in conditionality reﬂects the trade-off between fostering ﬁscal reform and creating
incentives for non-compliance.
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International ﬁnancial markets have experienced sovereign debt crises throughout history. In times of
balance-of-payment problems International Financial Institutions (IFIs) provide temporary ﬁnancial
assistance and require the debtor to meet speciﬁc conditions on macroeconomic policy. While over
the past 40 years conditionality attached to IFI loans has become increasingly important and countries
frequently utilized bailout programs, sovereign defaults occurred on a number of occasions, in partic-
ular in emerging market economies.1 Empirical evidence indicates that some countries are recidivist
borrowers who make repeated and prolonged use of ofﬁcial loans (Bird, Hussain and Joyce (2004),
Conway (2007)). In addition, completion rates of conditional bailout arrangements are low (Mussa
and Savastano (2000) and Bird (2002)).
This paper develops a dynamic stochastic model of a small open economy that rationalizes these
facts. The model features endogenous default risk as well as endogenous participation rates in bailout
programs and assumes that conditionality restricts ﬁscal policy in the recipient country. We analyze
the impact of conditional bailouts on sovereign default risk and interest rate spreads and evaluate the
effectiveness of conditionality.
Our model builds on the classic contribution by Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) and the recent quanti-
tative sovereign debt literature like Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) and Arellano (2008). We assume
a small open economy that is inhabited by a representative household who consumes and works.
The government ﬁnances unproductive government consumption by raising consumption taxes and
by issuing external debt. International ﬁnancial markets are incomplete and debt contracts are not
enforceable. If the country defaults on its outstanding debt it is temporarily excluded from credit
markets and faces a loss in output. Risk-neutral foreign lenders incorporate the default risk into their
pricing decision and charge a country risk premium. In times of economic crisis, an (unmodeled)
IFI provides ﬁnancial assistance but imposes macroeconomic conditions that restrict non-productive
government consumption. In each period, conditional on being in a good credit standing, the govern-
ment decides whether to fulﬁll its repayment obligations or to default. Moreover, taking as given the
amount of support and the restrictive ﬁscal target, the government chooses whether to participate in a
conditional bailout program.
In a quantitative exercise we apply our model to the Argentine economy and show that our theoretical
framework mimics the empirically observed duration and frequency of bailout programs. Our sim-
ulations suggest that the presence of IFI interventions make foreign lenders more willing to provide
credit to an indebted government since conditional bailout programs provide additional insurance.
The government takes advantage of lower interest rates and accumulates larger levels of external debt
1See Bird (2007) for a detailed discussion of conditionality and Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) for an extensive analysis of
sovereign defaults.
2leading to high and volatile interest rate spreads in equilibrium. As the simulated moments of the
interest rate spread are very close the empirical ones, the model helps to rationalize the disconnect
between low historical default probabilities and high average spreads (Arellano (2008)). In addition,
our model accounts for the key empirical patterns in emerging market business cycles, in particular
procyclical ﬁscal policy and countercyclical interest rates.2
Our analysis of the effectiveness of conditionality suggest that imposing ﬁscal policy constraints on
the provision of ﬁnancial assistance substantially increases the welfare of the representative house-
hold. We vary the intensity of conditionality and highlight the trade-off between fostering ﬁscal
reform and creating incentives for non-compliance. On the one hand, tight constraints on macroe-
conomic policy limit ﬁscal mismanagement and promote the recovery of the economy. On the other
hand, severe conditionality increases the government’s incentives to abandon the arrangement. En-
hancingconditionalityshortensthedurationbutincreasesthefrequencyofbailoutsleadingtoahigher
volatility in the private sector. Our welfare analysis supports the existence of a Laffer-curve suggest-
ing that tightening conditionality does not necessarily improve its effectiveness.3
Our paper builds on the recent quantitative sovereign debt literature, in particular Cuadra, Sanchez
and Sapriza (2010) who develop a model with endogenous default risk and endogenous ﬁscal policy
to rationalize the empirical fact that ﬁscal policy tends to move procyclically in emerging markets.
Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) and Roch and Uhlig (2011) analyze the impact of bailouts on sovereign
default risk where the latter focus on the case of a monetary union. While Aguiar and Gopinath
(2006) and Roch and Uhlig (2011) abstract from conditionality, Boz (2011) rationales the quantita-
tive properties of conditional IFI lending within a model of sovereign debt. To model conditionality
she assumes that the government acts under a higher rate of time preference leading to a more conser-
vative debt policy. Aguiar and Gopinath (2006), Roch and Uhlig (2011) and Boz (2011) all consider
endowment economies and abstract from endogenous ﬁscal policy. In contrast, our paper develops a
production economy and analyzes the dynamic interaction of conditional bailouts, ﬁscal policy and
sovereign default risk. Importantly, to model conditionality we leave the government’s preferences
unchanged and, instead, impose an additional constraint that restricts the set of ﬁscal policies. Our
study contributes to the literature by focusing on the duration and frequency of bailout programs as
well as the effectiveness of conditionality.
Papers that analyze different features in quantitative sovereign debt models are, e.g., Cuadra and
Sapriza (2008) and Hatchondo, Martinez and Sapriza (2009) who study the role of political uncer-
tainty, Yue (2010) who focuses on debt renegotiations and Mendoza and Yue (2011) who analyze
2The empirical cyclical properties of ﬁscal policy are well documented in Talvi and Vegh (2005), Ilzetzki and Vegh
(2008) and Kaminsky, Reinhart and Vegh (2004). Neumeyer and Perri (2005) and Uribe and Yue (2006) analyze the
interaction of interest rates and business cycles.
3See also Bird (2001a) for a general discussion of the potential existence of a Laffer-curve in conditionality.
3the interaction of endogenous output costs and business cycles in emerging markets. Durdu, Nunes
and Sapriza (2010) study the role of news shock while Hatchondo and Martinez (2009), Arellano and
Ramanarayanan (2010) and Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2011) explore the importance of the maturity
structure of bonds.
Our paper is related to the extensive literature that investigates the role of the International Monetary
Fund (IMF). In this strand of literature most attention is devoted to the determinants of participation
in IMF programs, the macroeconomic effects of IMF supported structural programs as well as on
the compliance rates of conditionality. For a discussion of the empirical ﬁndings concerning IMF
programs we refer to the excellent surveys by Bird (2001b), Joyce (2004) and Bird (2007) and the
references therein. Finally, our paper is linked to the foreign aid literature that models conditionality
as a limited enforceable contract, e.g., Svensson (2003), Cordella, Dell’Ariccia and Kletzer (2003),
Cordella and Dell’Ariccia (2007), Scholl (2009) and Scholl (2011). These studies analyze the prop-
erties of optimal self-enforcing contracts in different setups and with different focuses.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we describe the empirical char-
acteristics of bailout programs and focus on the frequency and duration as well as the properties of
structural conditions. In section 3 we lay out the theoretical framework. Section 4 deals with the cal-
ibration, presents the quantitative properties of the model and conducts a welfare analysis to analyze
the effectiveness of conditionality. Finally, section 5 concludes.
2 IMF Programs and Conditionality
In this section we take the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as a representative of the IFIs, because
with 187 member countries it belongs to the most important international intergovernmental organi-
zation. According to its Articles of Agreement, the IMF provides temporary ﬁnancial and technical
assistance to member countries that experience balance-of-payments problems. An IMF-supported
program typically consists of two parts: IMF lending conditions and IMF conditionality.
IMF lending conditions specify the amount, interest and duration of the bailout program as well as in
which tranches the loan is disbursed. The major part of IMF assistance is provided through Stand-By-
Arrangements (SBA) that typically have a duration of 12-36 months. As reported in table 1 the IMF
lending rate is similar to the interest rate of the United States. Since private international ﬁnancial
markets incorporate default risks and charge country risk premia, the IMF lending rate is considerably
lower than the country-speciﬁc interest rate. Therefore IMF credits involve a grant component for
countries that borrow in times of a debt crisis. A further important aspect of IMF lending is discussed
by Jeanne and Zettelmeyer (2001) who analyze the empirical repayment history of IMF loans and
report rather low default risks on ofﬁcial loans.
The second essential part of an IMF-supported program is conditionality. The IMF provides tem-
4porary ﬁnancial support only if the recipient government agrees to implement pre-deﬁned economic
policies which are designed according to the objectives of the IMF.4 Bird (2007) reports that in the last
decades the average number of conditions attached to an IMF-supported program has risen indicating
that conditionality has become increasingly important.5 The Independent Evaluation Ofﬁce (2007)
highlights that during the years 1995-2004 about two-thirds of all structural conditions were nearly
equally distributed between the core areas taxation, public expenditure management and the ﬁnancial
sector. According to this evidence adjustments in the public sector belong to the main tasks that have
to be undertaken if the IMF intervenes. This ﬁnding will guide us when specifying conditionality in
our theoretical framework in section 3.
The extensive literature on the role of the IMF emphasizes three phenomena related to conditional
IMF-supported programs. First, non-completion of IMF programs is widespread, see, e.g., Mussa
and Savastano (2000) and Bird (2002). Second, as Bird et al. (2004) and Conway (2007) point out,
some member countries are recidivist borrowers, i.e., they tend to return frequently to the IMF. Third,
and related to the second phenomenon, there is evidence on prolonged use of IMF resources calling
the temporary nature of IMF lending into question (Bird et al. (2004) and Conway (2007)).
Table 2 and ﬁgure 1 illustrate these empirical ﬁndings for some selected emerging market countries
that had several default episodes. In table 2 we follow Mussa and Savastano (2000) and view the
fraction of IMF loans that is actually disbursed relative to the committed under each program as
a proxy for completion. Using data provided by Conway (2007), the statistics reveal that several
emerging market economies defaulted frequently on their external debt obligations while repeatedly
making use of IMF fund resources. During the years from 1976 to 2010 for instance Argentina had 8
IMF-supported economic stabilization programs with an average program duration of approximately
5 quarters. About 37 percent of the programs used less than 50 percent of the committed IMF ﬁnanc-
ing. Brazil, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Peru, Turkey and Uruguay are characterized by similar properties.
The left panel of ﬁgure 1 shows the the distribution of IMF-supported programs by duration for the
countries considered in table 2. 40 percent of all programs last for 4 quarters. Conway (2007) points
out that countries tend to repeatedly negotiate economic programs with the IMF that begin just as
the previous program has ended. The right panel of ﬁgure 1 displays the distribution of successive
programs that are interrupted by discontinuation periods of different length. Around 34 percent of
programs are consecutive agreements that are interrupted by at most one quarter indicating a high rate
of recidivism.
4Following the IMF’s Articles of Agreement conditional lending is required for two reasons: IMF conditionality helps
countries to overcome the problems that led to its ﬁnancial problems and it ensures that IMF loans are repaid. For a broader
debate on the rationale for conditionality we refer to Bird (2007).
5The Independent Evaluation Ofﬁce (2007) shows that there seems to be no reduction in the number of conditions after
the introduction of the streamlining initiative.
53 The Model
3.1 The Environment






where  2 (0;1) denotes the rate of time preference and ct and lt indicate consumption and labor
supply, respectively. The per period utility u : R2
+ ! R is continuous, twice differentiable in both
arguments, strictly increasing in c, strictly decreasing in l, jointly strictly concave in c and l and
satisﬁes the Inada conditions. The household’s budget constraint reads as
(1 + t)ct = yt; (2)
where t denotes the consumption tax raised by the government.6 Output yt is produced via a constant
returns to scale production function f(lt), f : R+ ! R+, and is subject to productivity shocks:
yt = ztf(lt):
Productivity zt 2 Z is assumed to have a compact support, Z = [z;  z]  R+, and to follow a Markov




t [v(gt) + (1   )u(ct;lt)]; (3)
where gt denotes unproductive government consumption. The per-period utility v : R+ ! R is
continuous, twice differentiable, strictly increasing in gt, strictly concave in gt and satisﬁes the In-
ada conditions. The parameter  2 (0;1) measures the benevolence of the government and can be
interpreted as an indicator of the degree of ﬁscal mismanagement.
The government has access to incomplete international ﬁnancial markets where it can issue non-
contingent one-period bonds bt+1 2 B = [b; b]  R. Let qt(bt+1;zt) denote the bond price of
a ﬁnancial contract with face value bt+1 issued by the government that experiences a productivity
shock zt. Foreign creditors are risk-neutral and have perfect information about the country’s produc-
tivity. When the government borrows it receives q(bt+1;zt)bt+1 < 0 at date t from foreign creditors
and promises to repay bt+1 at date t+1. However, debt contracts are not enforceable and the govern-
ment can choose to default. We follow Arellano (2008) and assume that the costs of default consist
6We follow Cuadra et al. (2010) and assume that the government taxes private consumption. This assumption is in line
with the empirical ﬁndings of Gavin and Perotti (1997) and Talvi and Vegh (2005) who report that tax revenues in Latin
America depend heavily on indirect taxes like taxes on goods and services.
6of two components. First, the defaulting government is temporarily excluded from international ﬁ-
nancial markets, i.e., the government stays in ﬁnancial autarky and is allowed to re-enter international
ﬁnancial markets with an exogenous probability . Second, there occur direct output costs (z) such
that (z)f(l)  zf(l) holds in ﬁnancial autarky.
In times of economic crisis, an IFI provide ﬁnancial assistance, but, in turn, requires the government
to implement pre-speciﬁed macroeconomic conditions. The government decides whether to enter, to
exit or to remain in a bailout program. The government’s budget constraint reads as
gt = tct + bt   qt(bt+1;zt)bt+1 + htat; (4)
where ht denotes an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the government accepts a bailout
program and 0 otherwise. If the government makes use of ﬁnancial assistance, the IFI imposes ﬁscal
conditions that restrict non-productive government consumption in the following way:
g
c
 G if ht = 1: (5)
This constraint restricts the size of the public sector and limits ﬁscal mismanagement. Note that we do
not restrict the government’s debt policy so that the dynamic pattern of debt remains an endogenous
outcome.
As table 1 indicates bailouts are provided as loans below market rates and, therefore, imply transfers
to the debtor. We capture this fact by modeling bailouts as grants denoted by at and assume that the
IFI provides ﬁnancial assistance conditional on the amount of outstanding debt bt and the productivity





(bt) for bt  ~ b and zt  ~ z
0 else;
(6)
with 0(bt) < 0 and 00(bt)  0. ~ b and ~ z denote threshold values that characterize the bailout policies
of the IFI.8
7Here, we follow Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) and assume that also creditors view bailouts as pure transfers and do not
internalize that they ﬁnance bailouts through tax payments.
8As we consider a production economy with endogenous ﬁscal policy as well as endogenous default risk and endogenous
participation rates in bailout programs, modeling bailouts as grants greatly reduces the complexity of the model, in particular
in terms of computational time. In contrast, in a stylized endowment economy Boz (2011) explicitly considers IMF-lending
as additional state variable that belongs to the choice set of the government. While she assumes that countries have access
to IMF-lending at any point in time, we focus on the temporary support offered by IFIs only in times of balance-of-payment
crises. She excludes permanent IFI borrowing by assuming that the price of a one-period non-contingent IFI bond is
decreasing in the size of the IFI loan. Hence, in times of economic booms the country borrows from private capital markets
while in times of recessions IFI borrowing becomes more attractive. In default episodes countries use IFI loans to smooth
consumption.
73.2 Equilibrium
This section deﬁnes and characterize a dynamic recursive equilibrium for our model economy. Given
the aggregate state (b;z) the equilibrium is determined by the policy functions of the private sector as
well as the public sector and the pricing decision rules for bonds by foreign creditors.
3.2.1 Private Sector
In equilibrium the representative household takes the public sector policies as given and chooses
private consumption and labor effort by maximizing expected discounted life-time utility (1) subject









where uc and ul denote the marginal utility of consumption and labor, respectively, and fl refers to
the marginal product of labor.
3.2.2 Public Sector
In each period, conditional on being in a good credit standing and taking as given the bond price, the
realization of the productivity shock and the amount of outstanding bonds, the government decides
whether to fulﬁll its repayment obligations or to default. Moreover, taking as given the amount
of ﬁnancial assistance as well as the ﬁscal constraint, the government chooses between entering,
continuing or exiting a conditional bailout program with the IFI. The government determines its
optimal choices by maximizing its preferences (3) subject to the government budget constraint (4),
the optimality conditions of the private sector (2) and (7) and, in case of ﬁnancial assistance, subject
to conditionality (5).
Given an outstanding debt amount of b and a technology realization of z let V 0(b;z) : B  Z !
R be the value function when the government has access to international ﬁnancial markets. The
government determines its optimal choices by comparing the value functions of four options:
V 0(b;z) = max
n





b V c(b;z) : B  Z ! R denotes the government’s value function of honoring its outstanding external
debt and staying in the credit market. b V d(z) : Z ! R is the value function of defaulting on the whole
amount of external debt and being punished by a temporary stay in ﬁnancial autarky and an output
loss. b V c(b;z) and b V d(z) both assume that no ﬁnancial assistance is provided and the government is
unrestricted in designing its ﬁscal policies. In contrast, V
c(b;z) : B  Z ! R and V
d(z) : Z ! R
refer to the value functions associated with a bailout program where the government acts subject to
8conditionality. The former is the value function of receiving ﬁnancial assistance and fulﬁlling debt
obligations while the latter is the value function of defaulting in spite of IFI assistance.
If the government receives no assistance from the IFI and honors its debt obligations, the government
does not face any constraints that restricts its ﬁscal policy choices. The government takes the bond
price q(b0;z) as given and solves the following maximization problem:
b V c(b;z) = max
g;;b0;c;l








g = c + b   q(b0;z)b0;








If, instead, the government defaults on its debt, it relaxes its budget constraint by not repaying its
debt but faces costs arising from the temporary exclusion from international ﬁnancial markets and the
direct output loss represented by (z). In this case, the maximization problem is given by:
b V d(z) = max
g;;c;l




















 denotes the exogenous re-entry probability to international ﬁnancial markets.
In times of an economic crisis, zt  ~ z, bt  ~ b, the IFI provides ﬁnancial assistance but imposes con-
ditionality in form of restricting unproductive government consumption. In this case, the government
compares the costs of conditionality and the beneﬁts of receiving assistance that relaxes the budget
constraint. If the government does not default on its debt, the optimal choices are the outcome of the












g = c + b   q(b0;z)b0 + a;










If the economic crisis is very severe the government may choose to dishonor its debt obligations















g = c + a;











In the following, we characterize the government’s default and conditionality policies by a default
set and a bailout set. Let D(b) denote the set of productivity realizations z 2 Z for which default is
optimal given an asset level of b and let H(b) denote the set of productivity realizations z 2 Z for
which a bailout program is optimal given an asset level of b. With the deﬁnition







b V (b;z) = max
n
b V c(b;z); b V d(z)
o
;





1 if b V (b;z) < V (b;z)
0 else:
The bailout set is given by H(b) = fz 2 Z : h(b;z) = 1g. Similarly, to specify the default set we
deﬁne

















1 if V c(b;z) < V d(z)
0 else
implying the default set D(b) = fz 2 Z : d(b;z) = 1g.
3.2.3 Foreign Creditors
The government, conditional on being in a good credit standing, is able to borrow from or to save to a
large number of identical inﬁnitely lived risk-neutral foreign creditors. Foreign creditors have perfect
information about the productivity realization and they can borrow or lend from international capi-
tal markets at the constant risk-free rate rf. Foreign creditors incorporate the government’s default
























sovereign’s interest rate is given by the relation rc(b0;z) = 1=q(b0;z) 1 while the interest rate spread
is described by s(b0;z) = rc(b0;z)   rf.
3.2.4 Recursive Equilibrium
Given the speciﬁcation of the decision problems of the agents in the economy, in the following, we
deﬁne the recursive equilibrium.
Deﬁnition 1. The recursive equilibrium for this small open economy is deﬁned as
1. a set of policy functions for household’s consumption c(b;z) and labor time l(b;z),
2. a set of policy functions for the government’s debt policy b0(b;z), government consumption
g(b;z) and tax policy (b;z),
3. the default set D(b) and the bailout set H(b),
114. the price function for bonds q(b0;z),




1. taking as given the government policies household’s consumption c(b;z) and labor time l(b;z)
satisfy the optimality condition (7) and the household’s budget constraint (2),
2. taking as given the bond price function q(b0;z), the optimal policies of the household, the
amount of ﬁnancial assistance a as well as conditionality described by constraint (5), the gov-
ernment’s policy functions b0(b;z), g(b;z), (b;z), the default set D(b) and the bailout set H(b)
solve (8), (9), (10), (11) and (12),




In our quantitative analysis we apply our model to Argentina to study the interaction of conditional
bailout programs, ﬁscal policy and default episodes. Argentina is a typical emerging market economy
that frequently made use of IMF conditional lending facilities but experienced several sovereign debt
crises in the past, see table 2 and Beim and Calomiris (2001) and Reinhart and Rogoff (2008). Most
recently, in 2001, Argentina defaulted on its public external debt after having accumulated large ﬁs-
cal deﬁcits in the 1990s. At the beginning of the 1990s Argentina’s economy was characterized by
high inﬂation rates and economic stagnation. To achieve price stability, the convertibility regime was
adopted that pegged the peso to the US Dollar. The loss of monetary policy increased the importance
of ﬁscal policy to react to adverse shocks, however, Argentina was characterized by fragile politi-
cal institutions, weak ﬁscal discipline and a severe dependence on external borrowing (Independent
Evaluation Ofﬁce (2004)). According to Mussa (2002) the inability of the government to maintain a
sustainable ﬁscal policy was the the primary root of this debt crisis. In early 2000 the IMF approved a
three-year Stand-By-Arrangement in which structural ﬁscal reform and ﬁscal consolidation were the
main program goals. But, as the Independent Evaluation Ofﬁce (2004) emphasizes, the conditional
bailout program was not successful in promoting economic recovery and lowering interest rates. In
December 2001 the ﬁfth review of the program was not approved because of substantial discrepan-
cies between the IMF staff and Argentina’s authorities on the prospects for restoring the health of the
public ﬁnances (Independent Evaluation Ofﬁce (2004)). On December 23 Argentina defaulted on its
public external debt.
12The ﬁrst column of table 4 summarizes business cycle statistics for the Argentine economy. The
quarterly real series are taken from Argentina’s Ministry of Economics and Finance (MECON). They
are seasonally adjusted and range from 1993:1 to 2010:4. For the consumption tax  we use an
inﬂation tax as a proxy due to lack of adequate data. The inﬂation tax is constructed as  = 
1+
where  denotes CPI inﬂation.9 The interest rate series is the JP Morgan Emerging Markets Bond
Index (EMBI Global). External debt is measured by public and publicly guaranteed external debt
which is obtained from the World Bank for 1980-2009. The trade balance is given as a percentage of
output. Output, private and government consumption are in logs. All series are detrended using the
Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter with a smoothing parameter of 1600.
As reported by Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) and Arellano (2008) output is negatively correlated with
the interest rate spread. The mean interest rate spread is 12:54 percent and the volatility amounts to
8:28 percent. Consumption is more volatile than output and the trade balance is countercyclical. The
tax rate is negatively correlated with output which is in line with the empirical study of Talvi and
Vegh (2005).
To evaluate the grant component of IMF credits we employ the difference between the lending rate
of the IMF and the country-speciﬁc interest rate charged by foreign creditors:
at = stbIMF
t : (15)
st denotes the interest rate spread and bIMF
t refers to the use of IMF credit taken from the International
Financial Statistics database. Using equation (15) to quantify the grant component rests on the per-
ception that countries repay IMF loans which is in line with the low empirical default risks on ofﬁcial
debt reported by Jeanne and Zettelmeyer (2001). However, since countries are usually completely
separated from private ﬁnancial markets in times of economic crisis, equation (15) seems to be a con-
servative estimate of the grant component of ofﬁcial loans. In contrast, Aguiar and Gopinath (2006)
assume that the total amount of IMF credit is given as a grant abstracting from the fact that countries
need to repay IMF loans. In comparison to equation (15) this a high estimate of the grant component
of bailout programs. In our quantitative exercise we assume intermediate values.
Table 4 reveals that the grant component based on equation (15) is negatively correlated with the ratio
of government to private consumption. This is reﬂected by the mean value of
g
c that is lower in times
of positive IMF credits than otherwise. In our subsequent analysis we interpret this ﬁnding as the
outcome of structural conditions that are imposed on the provision of ﬁnancial assistance.
9Talvi and Vegh (2005) argue that in developing and emerging market countries tax rates are often based on consumption
taxes. Thus, a inﬂation tax as a proxy for tax rates seems to be appropriate.
134.2 Functional Forms and Calibration
To calibrate the model to the Argentine economy we specify functional forms and choose parameter
values. Table 3 summarizes the set of parameters and indicates whether the parameter values are
chosen based on the sovereign debt literature, estimated from the data or calibrated to match model
statistics to the data.
We employ the following per-period utility functions:
u(c;l) =










where  > 0 denotes the parameter of relative risk aversion and 1
  is the intertemporal labor elasticity.
Note that this speciﬁcation implies that the marginal rate of substitution between private consumption
and labor is independent of consumption. We follow Mendoza (1991), Neumeyer and Perri (2005)
and Cuadra et al. (2010) and set 1
  equal to 2:22. The parameter of relative risk aversion is set
to 2. The quarterly world risk-free interest rate rf is set to 1 percent which is a standard value in
quantitative business cycle studies.
The preference parameter  that speciﬁes the weight on unproductive government consumption is
set to 0:495 to match the empirically observed average ratio of government consumption to private
consumption of 20:26 percent. If the government enters a bailout program with an IFI
g
c is restricted
to G = 0:19 which corresponds to the empirical mean value in times of positive IMF credits, see ﬁrst
column of table 4.
As in Cuadra et al. (2010) the production function is assumed to be linear in labor, f(l) = l. We






E(z) if z > E(z)
z else;
with  2 (0;1). We set the default penalty  equal to 0:975 and assume that the rate of time preference
 takes the value 0:91. The parameterizations of  and  are set to match a default probability of 5
percent10 and an average debt service on external debt to GDP ratio (public and publicly guaranteed)
of 2:90 percent. The probability  of re-entering ﬁnancial markets is set to 0:17 which is in line with
values that have been used in previous studies.11
10Argentina experienced default episodes in 1951, 1956, 1982, 1989 and 2001.
11Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) set  to 0:10 while Arellano (2008) choose 0:282.
14We assume that the ﬁnancial beneﬁts of a bailout programs are linear in the outstanding amount of
foreign assets:




 b for b  ~ b and z  ~ z
0 else;
where~ b = 0 and ~ z = 1.12 If the interest rate spread is used to calculate the empirical grant component
according to equation (15), it amounts to 8 percent of external debt in the year 2001. If instead the
grant component is assumed to be equal to the total amount of IMF credit, it takes a value of 20
percent of external debt. In our benchmark calibration we assume an intermediate value and set
 = 0:14. In our sensitivity analysis we vary  within the interval [0:08;0:20].
Productivity shocks are assumed to follow an AR(1) process:
log(zt) = z log(zt 1) + "t;
with "t is i.i.d. N(0;2
"). The parameters of the productivity shock process are set as to match the
autocorrelation and standard deviation of Argentine real GDP series.
4.3 Results
In this section we study the quantitative predictions of our benchmark model economy. To highlight
the impact of conditional bailout programs on default risk and ﬁscal policy, we facilitate a comparison
with a model economy in which no IFI is present.13 Table 4 reports the cyclical properties of the
simulated times series as well as statistics on the duration and frequency of the use of conditional
bailout programs. The business cycle statistics are based on average values over 1000 simulations of
160 quarters. The simulated series are detrended using the Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter with a smoothing
parameter of 1600.
Table 4 shows that the benchmark economy matches the key properties of the Argentine data. The
model predicts 11 programs in 40 years with an average duration of 3:73 quarters which mimics the
empirically observed frequency and duration of bailout programs quite well. A comparison of the
cyclical properties of the benchmark model and the model without an IFI reveals that conditional
bailout programs increase the mean and the volatility of the interest rate spread. As the simulated
moments are very close to the empirical ones, the model helps to rationalize the disconnect between
low historical default probabilities and high and volatile interest rate spreads (Arellano (2008)).
The model can account for the key business cycle statistics in emerging market economies. In partic-
ular, consumption is more volatile than output and the trade balance is countercyclical. As in Arellano
12We veriﬁed the robustness of the results with respect to these choices and conducted only minor differences.
13The model without an IFI is similar to the one in Cuadra et al. (2010).
15(2008) and Aguiar and Gopinath (2006), the economy is more borrowing constrained in times of re-
cessions because of higher interest rate spreads. In line with Cuadra et al. (2010) tax rates behave
countercyclically reﬂecting the fact that in bad economic times borrowing becomes more expensive
so that the government ﬁnances its consumption mainly by taxing its citizens. The model accounts
well for the empirical fact that public consumption is less procyclical than private consumption. How-
ever, the model overstates the volatility of public consumption and understates the volatility of the
tax rate. Moreover, as in most quantitative models of sovereign debt, external debt as a share of GDP
is far too low.
To explore the economic mechanisms behind these results, the left panel of ﬁgure 2 plots the bond
price q(b0;z) as a function of assets b0 for two types of productivity shocks z. It is evident that, ﬁrst,
the bond price charged by foreign creditors is an increasing function in foreign assets. For very low
levels of debt the government always repays and the bond price is equal to the inverse of the risk-free
rate. Higher levels of foreign debt make repayment less attractive and default incentives rise. Since
foreign creditors incorporate the default probability in their pricing decision they charge higher risk
premia. Second, the bond price is an increasing function in the productivity shock. A country that
experiences an adverse economic shock is less able to service its external debt obligations. The higher
probability of default lowers bond prices in times of recessions. Third, the bond price is greater in
the presence of an IFI. The intuition is straightforward: Since foreign creditors anticipate IFI support
in times of economic crisis, they are more willing to provide credit to indebted countries and charge
lower interest rates. These ﬁndings are reﬂected in the borrowing function b0(b;z) shown in the right
panel of ﬁgure 2. Compared to the model without an IFI, default occurs at higher levels of foreign
debt. Consequently, for a given level of debt the government borrows more at lower interest rates.
The simulation results presented in table 4 reveal that in equilibrium the government takes advantage
of lower interest rates and accumulates larger levels of external debt if an IFI is present. In turn,
higher levels of debt lead to higher default probabilities and greater and more volatile interest rate
spreads.
As discussed in section 2, the empirical literature emphasizes that some countries are recidivist bor-
rowers who make repeated and prolonged use of ofﬁcial loans, see Bird et al. (2004), Bird (2002)
and Conway (2007). To study the quantitative predictions of our model with respect to the dura-
tion and the recidivism in the use of IFI assistance, the left panel of ﬁgure 3 shows the distribution
of conditional bailout programs by their duration. In the right panel, we calculate the distribution
of successive programs that are interrupted by discontinuation periods of different length. Thereby,
we exclude programs that are interrupted by default episodes. Figure 3 reveals that the majority of
programs runs for a short time period. Around 70 percent of all programs have a duration between
one and four quarters. Our model predicts that the mass of successive programs have discontinuation
16periods of few quarters. More than 40 percent of all consecutive arrangements are interrupted by only
one quarter indicating a high rate of recidivism. The shapes of the distributions are broadly in line
with the empirical distributions plotted in ﬁgure 1. However, our theoretical framework overstates the
number of programs that last for only few quarters.
To understand the dynamic impact of conditional bailouts and the determinants of entries and exits,
we collect all conditional bailout arrangements that have a duration of 3 quarters.14 Figure 4 plots
the average pattern of the macroeconomic variables over time. Quarter 1 denotes the period before
the government enters the conditional bailout program while in quarter 5 the program is abandoned.
The shaded area refers to the time in conditionality. We distinguish two cases: First, the government
exits the conditional bailout program to be sovereign and unrestricted in its ﬁscal policies (solid line).
Second, the government exits the arrangement by defaulting on its external debt (dashed line). The
simulated time paths reveal that a country enters a conditional bailout program with an IFI if it is in-
debted and hit by an adverse productivity shock such that the interest rate spread is high. In exchange
for the ﬁnancial support the recipient government fulﬁlls the restriction on its public consumption and
reduces its external debt. The tax cut has a stimulating effect on output and consumption. As long
as the country is sufﬁciently indebted, the beneﬁts of the ﬁnancial assistance outweigh the costs of
conditionality and the government continues to participate in the bailout program. The government
decides to leave the conditional program to return to sovereignty if a series of favorable productivity
shocks helps the economy to recover. Interest rate spreads decrease and the cost of conditionality
arising from restrictive public consumption becomes too high such that the government leaves the
bailout program. In contrast, the country abandons the conditional bailout arrangement by default if
it is hit by a series of adverse shocks repressing production and private consumption and increasing
the interest rate spread. These ﬁndings are in line with the view that a combination of weak ﬁscal dis-
cipline and adverse external shocks contributed to Argentina’s crisis in 2001 (Independent Evaluation
Ofﬁce (2004)).
4.4 Policy Implications
The empirical evidence on low rates of compliance with conditionality and the repeated and persistent
use of ofﬁcial ﬁnancial assistance motivated the IMF ‘streamlining’ initiative introduced in 2000. The
aim was to improve the completion, implementation and effectiveness of conditionality by making it
more parsimonious (Bird (2009)). In this section we employ our theoretical framework to analyze the
macroeconomic impact of different intensities of conditionality and discuss policy implications.
To evaluate the effectiveness of conditionality and to derive policy implications we calculate the
impact of conditional bailout programs on the welfare of the representative household. We compare
14The ﬁndings are similar for arrangements that have a shorter or longer duration.
17the lifetime utility in the model economy with an IFI with the lifetime utility in the model economy
without an IFI and use compensating variations to formulate differences. We express the welfare
gain in terms of percentage deviations in certainty-equivalence consumption. Let  c and  l denote the
average consumption and labor effort in the model economy where no IFI is present. Moreover, let c
t
and l










For comparison, we report the welfare gain of the government by calculating the compensation pa-
rameter g that solves
1 X
t=0




t) + (1   )u(c
t;l
t)]; (17)
where g denotes the average government consumption in the model where no IFI is present while g
t
refers to the optimal decision rule at date t in the model economy with an IFI.
In the ﬁrst row of ﬁgure 5 we vary the intensity of conditionality and plot the resulting welfare gains
of the household and the government. To analyze the effectiveness of conditionality, we focus on the
welfare of the representative household. Our welfare calculations reveal that conditional bailouts gen-
erate substantial welfare gains of up to 1:96 percent measured in certainty-equivalent consumption
units. Our model predicts a Laffer-curve as the pattern of the household’s welfare gain is hump-
shaped implying that enhancing conditionality does not necessarily improve its effectiveness.15 If
conditionality is too strong such that the government does not make use of IFI grants the welfare
gains are obviously zero. If instead conditionality is too weak such that ﬁnancial assistance is un-
conditionally provided, the household beneﬁts from an increase in certainty-equivalent consumption
of 0.85 percent. These ﬁndings suggest that the design of conditionality has quantitatively sizeable
implications for the effectiveness of bailout programs.
Turning to the government, it is evident that the welfare gains are decreasing in the intensity of
conditionality. Clearly, the government beneﬁts most from unconditional bailouts that generate a
welfare gain of 4.14 percent of certainty-equivalent consumption.
The model predictions show that there is a trade-off between fostering efﬁcient economic policies
and creating incentives for non-compliance. If the government’s cost of tighter ﬁscal constraints
outweighs the beneﬁt of the ﬁnancial assistance, non-implementation is a likely outcome limiting
the effectiveness of conditionality. It turns out that our benchmark calibration is very close to the
maximum of the Laffer-curve. To explore the mechanisms of conditionality in greater detail, table 4
15Bird (2001a) argues verbally, but without any formal model, that such a Laffer curve in conditionality exists.
18reports the cyclical properties of the simulated times series as well as statistics on the duration and
frequency of bailout programs for ‘weak’ conditionality, G = 0:195, and ‘strong’ conditionality, G =
0:185. ‘Optimal’ conditionality refers to the peak of the Laffer-curve. The business cycle statistics
show that enhancing conditionality has two effects. On the one hand, stricter ﬁscal constraints reduce
thedistortiongeneratedbyﬁscalmismanagementresultinginstrongerreductionsintheratioofpublic
to private consumption, lower average shares of public external debt and reduced interest rate spreads.
On the other hand, enhancing conditionality makes bailout programs less attractive for the recipient
government so that shorter average program durations generate a higher volatility in the private sector
and greater default risks. The two opposing effects of fostering ﬁscal reform and creating incentives
for abandoning a conditional arrangement generate a u-shape in the volatility of production and an
inverted u-shape in the average interest rate spread.
Inthesecondrowofﬁgure5wevarythedegreeofﬁnancialassistanceofconditionalbailoutprograms
which is measured by the parameter . Welfare gains are increasing in the amount of ﬁnancial support
because of two reasons. First, higher grants allow to reduce the external debt burden so that the
interest rate spread decreases. Second, raising the ﬁnancial beneﬁt makes bailout programs more
attractive to the government and increases the likelihood that ﬁscal constraints are implemented. In
turn, theeffectiveness ofconditionality isimproved, however, atthe cost ofproviding greaterﬁnancial
assistance.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have developed a dynamic stochastic model of a small open economy to analyze the
connections between sovereign default, bailouts and ﬁscal policy. Our theoretical framework features
endogenous default risk as well as endogenous participation rates in bailout programs and assumes
that conditionality restricts ﬁscal policy. The model helps to rationalize three empirical facts. First,
there is considerable recidivism and persistence in the use of third-party assistance. Second, in spite
of conditionality, sovereign defaults occur. Third, average interest rate spreads are high and volatile
in emerging market economies.
Our ﬁndings suggest that conditional bailouts increase sovereign default risks as foreign lenders are
more willing to provide credit to indebted countries. To evaluate the effectiveness of conditionality
we have performed a detailed welfare analysis. Our model predicts that imposing conditions on
the provision of bailouts generates sizeable welfare gains. However, there is a trade-off between
promoting ﬁscal reform and creating incentives for non-compliance so that enhancing conditionality
shortens the duration of bailout programs but increases recidivism. Our welfare analysis supports the
existence of a Laffer-curve implying that tightening conditionality does not necessarily improve its
effectiveness.
19In light of the recent European debt crisis this paper points out the importance of analyzing the
dynamic interactions of bailouts and default risks to deepen our understanding of the effectiveness
of conditionality. In this context it seems to be particularly interesting to analyze the connection
between bailouts, conditionality and political turnovers. Moreover, it may be promising to study the
participation in bailout programs as a joint decision process of the debtor and the IFI. While in this
paper we have taken the policies of the IFI as exogenously given, modeling the IFI as an endogenous
decision-maker requires the speciﬁcation of a rationale for conditionality and the deﬁnition of the
objectives of the IFI. All these questions are, however, left for future research.
20A Numerical Algorithm
The model is solved by using value function iteration. The numerical algorithm builds on Hatchondo,
Martinez and Sapriza (2010) and employs cubic spline interpolations so that optimal policies are cho-
sen from a continuous set and productivity realizations are allowed that do not lie on the grid. We
approximate the equilibrium as the equilibrium of the ﬁnite-horizon economy and iterate simultane-
ous on the value and the bond price functions.
Given our preference speciﬁcation the household’s optimality condition (7) yields optimal labor sup-








Equation (18) and the budget constraints (2) and (4) allow us to express optimal private and govern-
ment consumption as functions of the decision variables b0 and .
The following algorithm is used to solve the model. We deﬁne evenly distributed grid vectors for bond
holdings b 2 [b; b] and productivity realizations z 2 [z;  z]. Let b V c






denote the initial guesses for the value functions. For every grid point (b;z) 2 [b; b][z;  z] and given
the initial guesses b V c





(0)(z) we ﬁrst ﬁnd candidate values for (0) and
b0
(0) by employing a global search procedure. These candidate values are then taken as initial guesses
for the FORTRAN optimization routine BCPOL from the IMSL library to ﬁnd (0) and b0
(0) via (9),
(10), (11) and (12), where V 0
(0)(b;z) satisﬁes equation (8). Given the initial guess, equations (13)
and (14) determine the the default probability (0)(b0
(0);z) and the bond price function q(0)(b0
(0);z),
respectively. Expected continuation values are computed using gauss-hermite quadrature points and
weights. To evaluate the expected continuation values for policies and productivity realizations that
do not lie on the grid we employ cubic spline interpolations using the FORTRAN CSDEC routine
from the IMSL library. The solutions found at each grid point are used to update the value functions
b V c





(1)(z). We iterate until the value functions converge.
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24Table 1: Interest Rates: IMF vs. U.S. Treasury Bonds
IMF U.S. Treasury bonds EMBI Global
2-year 3-year 5-year
1990 1999 5:75 5:77 5:97 6:30 14:03
2000 2010 3:44 3:06 3:29 3:74 8:68
Notes: Data are taken from the IMF database and Datastream. The interest
rate of the IMF is the IMF’s Adjusted Rate of Charge. The EMBI Global time
series starts in 1997.
Table 2: Fraction of IMF Loans Actually Disbursed, 1976-2010
Number of arrangements Duration Number of
Mean (Med) Defaults
x 2 [0;0:25) [0:25;0:50) [0:50;0:75) [0:75;1:0) 1 N (Quarters) 1900 2010
Argentina 1 2 3 1 1 8 5.25 (5.11) 5
Brazil 0 1 0 2 0 3 8.85 (6.90) 7
Costa Rica 5 1 1 1 1 9 5.01 (4.92) 6
Ecuador 3 1 1 0 2 7 4.97 (4.35) 7
Mexico 0 1 1 0 1 3 6.97 (6.10) 3
Peru 2 1 0 1 0 4 4.54 (4.15) 6
Turkey 1 2 0 3 1 7 7.19 (5.36) 5
Uruguay 7 2 0 1 2 12 5.27 (4.35) 6
All 19 11 6 9 8 53 5.68 (5.01)
Notes: Statistics refer to IMF Stand-By Arrangements. x denotes the fraction of total IMF loans disbursed. It is
calculated as the fraction of drawings actually made relative to committed IMF resources for each arrangement.
The table is constructed following Mussa and Savastano (2000) and using data from the data set in Conway
(2007). The number of default events are taken from Reinhart and Rogoff (2008).
Table 3: Benchmark Calibration
Risk aversion  2 literature
Time preference  0:91 calibration
Labor elasticity 1
  2:22 literature
Preference weight  0:495 calibration
Conditionality G 0:19 calibration
Bailout  0:14 data
Risk free rate rf 0:01 literature
Re-entry probability  0:17 literature
Default penalty  0:975 calibration
Productivity z 0:85 calibration
" 0:0138 calibration
25Table 4: Business Cycle Statistics
Argentine Benchmark No Strong Optimal Weak
Data Model IFI Conditionality
(y) 4:09 4:09 5:18 4:22 4:12 4:19
(s) 8:28 7:16 3:58 6:70 7:00 6:48
(c)=(y) 1:15 1:04 1:04 1:05 1:04 1:03
(g)=(y) 0:53 1:76 1:25 1:77 1:76 1:75
(nx=y)=(y) 0:39 0:20 0:12 0:19 0:20 0:21
()=(y) 0:48 0:23 0:10 0:24 0:23 0:22
(c;y) 0:98 0:98 0:99 0:98 0:98 0:98
(g;y) 0:59 0:74 0:96 0:66 0:75 0:81
(nx=y;y)  0:91  0:41  0:58  0:33  0:41  0:47
(;y)  0:41  0:14  0:50  0:19  0:12  0:07
(s;y)  0:69  0:26  0:45  0:17  0:28  0:35
(a;g=c)  0:30  0:50 -  0:62  0:52  0:22
E(s) 12:54 12:04 5:20 11:64 12:03 10:39
E(g=c) 20:26 20:26 21:72 20:36 20:24 20:2
E(g=c), Ia>0 18:97 18:79 - 18:26 18:76 19:32
E(b=y), Id6=1 -  5:96  4:14  5:57  5:95  6:61
Mean Duration 5:25 3:73 - 2:72 3:66 4:67
Mean No. of Programs 8 11:26 - 12:55 11:43 10:48
Default Prob. (in %) 5:00 5:00 2:88 4:99 5:03 4:70
Notes: The simulation results are averages over 1000 simulations whereas each simulation has a sample size of
160 quarters. The standard deviations are reported in percentages. All series are HP-ﬁltered with a smoothing
parameter of 1600. ‘Strong’ conditionality refers to G = 0:185; ‘weak’ conditionality refers to G = 0:195.
‘Optimal’ conditionality refers to the welfare maximizing value of G. y denotes production, c and g are private
and public consumption, respectively.  refers to the tax rate while b denotes public debt. nx is the trade
balance and a the grant component of IFI support. s denotes the interest spread. E(b=y), Id6=1 refers to the
mean value of debt if default episodes are excluded.
























Figure 1: Empirical Distribution of IMF Programs; The ﬁgure uses the data set provided by Conway (2007)
and refers to IMF Stand-By Arrangements. Horizontal axis: quarters; vertical axis: frequency.
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Figure 2: Policy Functions; Policy functions are based on the benchmark calibration.


















Figure 3: Distribution of Bailout Programs; Horizontal axis: quarters; vertical axis: frequency. The distri-
butions refer to the benchmark calibration.
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Figure 4: Dynamics During Conditionality; The ﬁgures assume the benchmark calibration and plot the
average patterns of the macroeconomic variables in the course of conditional bailout arrangements that have a
duration of 3 quarters. Horizontal axis: quarters; vertical axis: units. Quarter 1 denotes the quarter before the
government enters the conditional bailout program while in quarter 5 the program is abandoned. The shaded
area refers to the time in conditionality. The solid line refers to those cases where the government exits the
conditional program to be sovereign and unrestricted in its ﬁscal policies. The dashed line refers to those cases
where the government exits the arrangement by defaulting on its external debt.
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Figure 5: Welfare Gains; First row, horizontal axis: G; second row, horizontal axis: ; vertical axis: com-
pensation parameters h and g in percent and calculated according to equations (16) and (17), respectively.
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